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Continuing to drive under the following conditions which resulted
in falling asleep have justified a finding of gross or wilful and wanton
negligence; (1) drinking of intoxicating beverages; (2) prior warning,
refusal of relief; (3) excessive length of time at the wheel; and (4)
statutes limiting driving time.2 '
While the threat of civil liability serves as a deterrent to drivers
falling asleep while driving, a look at accident statistics indicates that
more extreme measures should be taken. Since the Supreme Court
of North Carolina apparently has adopted the rule as set out in State
v. Mundy regarding criminal liability, this writer would like to see
the legislature pass a statute similar to a recent Michigan statute.22
Although this statute does not speak expressly of sleeping at the wheel,
it does make negligence of a lesser degree than wilful and wanton, re-
sulting in death, a misdemeanor. Thus, if the rationale inferred in
Baird v. Baird and Hobbs v. Queen City Coach Co. is followed, the state
could get a conviction under this statute by proving the fact of falling
asleep alone without more. Such a measure should have some effect
in reducing highway fatalities.
PARKS ALLEN ROBERTS
Descent and Distribution-The Right of a Prospective Heir to Release
or Assign an Expectancy
During his lifetime, deceased entered into an agreement with four
of his eight children whereby in consideration of $6,000.00 paid to each
of them by him they released all interest and right of inheritance in his
estate. After the death of the deceased, the administrator of the estate
brought an action in which he sought to have the court rule upon the
legal effect of the instrument purporting to be a release. The North
Carolina Supreme Court unanimously held that the release was binding
and enforceable in equity if fairly made upon a valuable consideration
misconduct have been enacted in many states. These are commonly denominated
"guest" statutes. Certain things may amount to gross negligence or wilful and
wanton misconduct within the meaning of the guest statutes. Whether or not
there is such negligence as the statute requires is ordinarily a question for thejury. With its conclusion the courts do not ordinarily interfere. 5 AM.-JUR.,
Automobiles, 237, 240 (1933). Also see cases cited note 18 supra.
21 For example, see Belletete v. Morin, 322 Mass. 214, 76 N. E. 2d 660 (1948)
Oast v. Mopper, 58 Ga. App. 566, 199 S. E. 249 (1938) ; Smith v. Williams, 180
Ore. 232, 178 P. 2d 710 (1947) ; Masters v. Cardi, 186 Va. 261, 42 S. E. 2d 203
(1947).
"g MicH. STAT. ANN. c. 286a, § 28.556 (1954), which reads: "Any person who,
by the operation of any vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless,
feckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death
of another, shall be guilty of a [misdemeanor] punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison not more than two years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00..
Also see 49 Cal. Code, Penal § 500 (1956) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. § 8-529 (1947).
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and not accompanied by fraud or undue influence.' Thus, the four re-
leasing children were estopped to claim any part of the estate.
. Prior to the above case, Price v. Davis,2 there were only three cases
decided in North Carolina which considered the right of a prospective
heir to releases his expectancy4 in his ancestor's estate.5 The first of
these cases, Cannon v. Nowell,0 decided in 1859, held that a release of
this kind was invalid and unenforceable. Ruffin, J., said: "Heirs take
by positive law when the ancestor dies intestate and the course of
descents cannot be altered by words excluding particular heirs, or by any
agreement of parties."7 The court in the Price case would not accept
Cannon v. Nowell as still being the law in North Carolina, probably
because it was an action at law rather than equity before the fusion of
the two in this state. It seems to be the universal rule that the release
of an expectancy is recognized only in equity.8
Not until 1938 and 1939 did the question arise again in the cases
of Allen v. Allen9 and Coward v. Coward,10 which involved agreements
in the nature of a release. In the Allen case the parents of one of the
plaintiffs agreed with each other and with their children to pool their
separately held real estate and divide it during their lifetime among
their children. Two of the children received deeds for their shares; the
deeds made to the other children were never delivered to them. On the
death of the parents, one of the sons and the children of his deceased
sister sought to share with the other children in the real estate left
by the parents. The court held the plaintiffs estopped from taking any
real estate since that son and the sister had accepted the deeds as their
full shares of the lands belonging to their mother and father. Barnhill,
J., said: "It would be contrary to all principles of equity to permit them
'Price v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956).
2244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956).
'By a release is meant "the relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right,
claim, or privilege, by the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the
person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced." BLACK, LAW
Dicrion&ARY 1453 (4th ed. 1951).
' "An expectancy is the possibility of an heir apparent or presumptive that he
may inherit land; the possibility of the prospective next of kin that he acquire
personalty by a distribution or intestacy; and the possibility of a prospective legatee
or devisee that he may acquire property by will on the death of the testator."
SIMES & SMITH, FuTruRE INTEREsTs § 391 (2d ed. 1956).
Coward v. Coward, 216 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 2d 537 (1939); Allen v. Allen,
213 N. C. 264, 195 S. E. 801 (1938); Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N. C. 436 (1859).
6 51 N. C. 436 (1859).
Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N. C. 436, 437 (1859).
'In re Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 692 (1905); In re Simon, 158 Mich.
256, 122 N. W. 544 (1909); Nesmith v. Dinsmore, 17 N. H. 515 (1845) ; Price
v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956); Power's Appeal, 63 Pa. 443(1869) ; Gore v. Howard, 94 Tenn. 577, 30 S. W. 730 (1895) ; Coffman v. Coffman,
41 W. Va. 8, 23 S. E. 523 (1895).
p213 N. C. 264, 195 S. E. 801 (1938).
10216 N. C. 506, 5 S. E. 2d 537 (1939).
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[the plaintiffs] now to disavow the conditions upon which the deed was
given to them and to successfully assert a further interest in the real
estate of their parents.""1  "They accepted the benefits of the gift or
advancement and must abide by the conditions upon which it was
made.' 2  Except for the parties, the facts in the Coward case were
identical to those in the above case, and the court cited Allen v. Allen
with approval. The recent Price case predicated its decision mainly on
these two cases,' 3 and as a result there can now be no doubt that North
Carolina is in line with the greater weight of authority in holding such
contracts for the release of an expectancy valid and enforceable.
The majority jurisdictions' 4 enforce. the release on various theories.
It is frequently held that the release operates as an equitable estoppel,15
with some courts enforcing the release in equity because they presume
that the ancestor relied upon the agreement and, except for it, would
have made a will,16 and because the heir should be compelled to abide
by his promise in order to prevent the expectation of the ancestor from
being disappointed.' 7 One court applies the equitable estoppel theory in
order to secure equality among those who have equality of right.' 8
Several courts hold that the release acts as an extinguishment of the
11 Allen v. Allen, 213 N. C. 264, 271, 195 S. E. 801, 805 (1938).
'12 Id. at 269, 195 S. E. at 804. The court seems to have based its decision in
part on the theory that the deeds constituted an advancement liquidated by agree-
ment as to each child's share in the realty.
13 Price v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 233-34, 93 S. E. 2d 93, 96-97 (1956).
Arkansas: Leggett v. Martin, 203 Ark. 88, 156 S. W. 2d 71 (1941) ; Felton
v. Brown, 102 Ark. 658, 145 S. W. 552 (1912); California: In re Estate of
Wickersham, 153 Cal. 603, 96 Pac. 311 (1908) ; In re Garcelon's Estate, 104 Cal.
570, 38 Pac. 414 (1894); Georgia: Barham v. McKneely, 89 Ga. 812, 15 S. E.
761 (1892); Newsome v. Cogburn, 30 Ga. 291 (1860) ; Illinois: Mires v. Lauben-
heimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1916) ; Crum v. Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N. E.
956 (1890); Indiana: Brown v. Brown, 139 Ind. 653, 39 N. E. 152 (1894) ; Boyer
v. Boyer, 62 Ind. App. 73, 111 N. E. 952 (1915); Iowa: Stennett v. Stennett,
174 Iowa 431, 156 N. W. 406 (1916); Jones v. Jones, 46 Iowa 466 (1877);
Maine: Hilton v. Hilton, 103 Me. 92, 68 Atl. 595 (1907) ; Smith v. Smith, 59 Me.
214 (1871) ; Massachusetts: Kenney v. Tucker, 8 Mass. 143 (1811) ; Michigan:
In re Simon's Estate, 158 Mich. 256, 122 N. W. 544 (1909); New Hampshire:
Nesmith v. Dinsmore, 17 N. H. 515 (1845) ; New Jersey: Phillips v. Phillips, 122
Atl. 620 (N. J. Ch. 1923) ; Havens v. Thompson, 26 N. J. Eq. 383 (1875) ; New
York: Kinyon v. Kinyon, 72 Hun 452, 25 N. Y. S. 225 (1893); North Caro-
ina: Price v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956) ; Pennsylvania:
Estate of Summerville, 129 Pa. 631, 18 Atl. 554 (1889); West Virginia: Adams
v. Adams, 82 W. Va. 244, 95 S. E. 859 (1918); Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va.
8, 23 S. E. 523 (1895) ;. Wisconsin: Lifinger v. Field, 78 Wis. 367, 47 N. W. 613
(1890); England: Medcalf v. Medcalf, 1 Atk. 64, 26 Eng. Rep. 42 (Ch. 1737);
Canada: In re Lewis, 29 Ont. 609 (1898).
"In re Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 692 (1905) ; Pylant v. Bums, 153 Ga.
529, 112 S. E. 455, 28 A. L. R. 423 (1922) ; Boyer v. Boyer, 62 Ind. App. 73, 111
N. E. 952 (1916); Brands v. DeWitt, 44 N. J. Eq. 545, 10 Atl. 181 and 14 Atl.
894 (1888) ; Sis & SmITH, FuuR INTERESTS § 394 (2d ed. 1956).
"0 Eissler v. Hoppel, 158 Ind. 82, 62 N. E. 692 (1901) ; Brands v. DeWitt, supra
note 15; Martin v. Martin, 222 S. W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
1 Cases cited note 16 mpra.
18 Brands v. DeWitt, 44 N. 3. Eq. 545, 10 At. 181 and 14 Atl. 894 (1888).
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heir's right to take by descent.19 Once the consideration vests in the
releasor, it is held that the contract becomes binding in equity.2" The
minority jurisdictions21 on the other hand base their view on the reason-
ing of the common law in holding that a man cannot release what he does
not have22 and that the course of descent cannot be altered by any
agreement of the parties.
23
If the releasor dies before his ancestor, the release will bind the re-
leasor's heirs taking by representation. 24  This is based on the idea
that since the releasor would be estopped if he were alive from asserting
any claim in the estate, his heirs should likewise be estopped. 25  How-
ever, the release is not literally enforced in all cases. In Georgia it was
held that where the effect of the release is to disinherit a sole lineal heir
in favor of collateral heirs, the release will not be enforced because it is
opposed to that state's statute of distribution requiring the estate to
descend to heirs of the first degree and because disinheritance of a sole
descendant heir would be an unreasonable construction of the release. 28
A contract of release between a grandparent and a grandchild made
during the life of the grandchild's parents releasing the child's ex-
pectancy in his parent's estate has been held unenforceable because it
violates the law of descents and distributions and cuts off the grand-
child's right to take by inheritance his due proportion of his parent's
estate.
2 7
If fraud and gross inequality are not present, the consideration for
1 Mires v. Laubenheimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1916); Crum v.
Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N. E. 956 (1890) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 122 Atl. 620 (N. J.
Ch. 1923).2 In re Edelman's Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962 (1905) ; In re Garcelon's
Estate, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414 (1894) ; Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, 109
N. E. 1015 (1915).2 Kentucky: Elliott v. Leslie, 124 Ky. 553, 99 S. W. 619 (1907) ; Tennessee:
DeVault v. DeVault, 48 S. W. 361 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898); South Dakota: In re
Thompson's Estate, 26 S. D. 576, 128 N. W. 1127 (1910); Virginia: Headrick
v. McDowell, 102 Va. 124, 45 S. E. 804 (1903); accord: Florida: Towles v.
Roundtree, 10 Fla. 299 (1863) ; Ohio: Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am.
Dec. 85 (1857) ; Vermont: Simonds v. Simond's Estate, 96 Vt. 110, 117 Atl. 103(1922) ; see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 316 (1940).
"Elliott v. Leslie, supra note 21; Ferendaugh v. Ferendaugh, 104 Ohio St.
556, 136 N. E. 213 (1922) ; Simonds v. Simond's Estate, supra note 21.
"
2Towles v. Roundtree, 10 Fla. 299 (1863) ; Elliott v. Leslie, 124 Ky. 553,
99 S. W. 619 (1907) ; Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432 (1857); Headrick v.
McDowell, 102 Va. 124, 45 S. E. 804 (1903).
2 Simpson v. Simpson, 114 Ill. 603, 4 N. E. 137 and 7 N. E. 287 (1885);
Smith v. Smith, 59 Me. 214 (1871) ; Allen v. Allen, 213 N. C. 264, 195 S. E. 801
(1938) ; Powers Appeal, 63 Pa. 443 (1869); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 76 W. Va.
91, 85 S. E. 29 (1915) ; Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8, 23 S. E. 523 (1895) ;
In re Lewis, 29 Ont. 609 (1898). "It would seem that if the releasing child and
all his brothers and sisters predecease the source, the shares of the grandchildren
should not be affected by the release." ATKINSON, WILLS § 130 (2d ed. 1953).20 See note 24 supra.
20 Pylant v. Burns, 153 Ga. 529, 112 S. E. 455 (1922). Contra, RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 316, comment f and illustration 6 (1940).27 Pritchard v. Pritchard, 76 W. Va. 91, 85 S. E. 29 (1915).
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the release will usually be held fair even though its amount may later
turn out to be an inadequate share of the estate.28  The burden of
proving want of consideration is on the party asserting such want.
29
All that is required of the instrument to constitute a release which will
bar the releasor's descendants is that it meet the formalities of an
ordinary written contractY3° However, the release must be certain, clear
and unambiguous,31 executed by one competent to contract,32 and
sufficient to satisfy the local Statute of Frauds 33  This would indicate
that the courts do not favor a release by implication and that a draftsman
might well use the word "release" and specifically provide for the bar of
the releasor's descendants in case he should predecease his ancestor.
Another type of transaction closely related to and resembling the
release of an expectancy is the assignment of an expectancy. In most
states34 equity will enforce the assignment35 of an expectancy to a third
-"SEissler v. Hoppel, 158 Ind. 82, 62 N. E. 692 (1902); Boyer v. Boyer, 62
Ind. App. 73, 111 N. E. 952 (1916) ; Kenney v. Tucker, 8 Mass. 143 (1811) ; In re
Simon, 158 Mich. 256, 122 N. W. 544 (1909) ; Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8,
23 S. E. 523 (1895) ; It re Lewis, 29 Ont. 609 (1898).
"In re Edelman, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962 (1905) ; Summerville's Estate,
129 Pa. 631, 18 Atl. 554 (1889) ; Mow v. Baker, 24 S. W. 2d 1 (Tex. Com. App.
1930).
30 Mires v. Laubenheimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1915); Rodemeier v.
Brown, 169 Ill. 347, 48 N. E. 468 (1897) ; Binns v. Dazey, 147 Ind. 536, 44 N. E.
644 (1896) ; Brown v. Brown, 139 Ind. 653, 39 N. E. 152 (1894) ; Swigt v. Miles,
75 Ind. App. 85, 130 N. E. 130 (1921) ; Stolenburg v. Dierchs, 117 Iowa 25, 90
N. W. 525 (1902).
"' Williams v. Swango, 365 Ill. 549, 7 N. E. 2d 306 (1937) ; Mires v. Lauben-
heimer, supra note 30.
" Bishop v. Davenport, 58 Ill. 105 (1871).
"Gary v. Newton, 201 Ill. 170, 66 N. E. 267 (1903); Chidester v. Harlan,
180 Iowa 171, 159 N. W. 659 (1916) ; Riddell v. Riddell, 70 Neb. 472, 97 N. W.
609 (1903) ; Brands v. DeWitt, 44 N. J. Eq. 545, 10 Atl. 181, 14 Atl. 894 (1888).
However, the agreement may be oral if the parent has carried out the agreement.
Mixture Guano Co. v. McKoone, 168 Ga. 317, 147 S. E. 711 (1929) ; Mires v.
Laubenheimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N. E. 106 (1916).
" Alabama: Fuller v. Nichols, 219 Ala. 58, 121 So. 52 (1929) ; California:
Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 126 Pac. 149 (1912) ; Connecticut: Brown v.
Brown, 66 Conn. 493, 34 Atl. 490 (1895) ; Idaho: Casady v. Scott, 40 Idaho 137,
237 Pac. 415 (1925); Illinois: Thornton v. Louch, 297 Ill. 204, 130 N. E. 467(1921) ; In re Landis, 41 F. 2d 700 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 282 U. S. 872 (1930) ;
Iowa: Burk- v. Morain, 223 Iowa 399, 272 N. W. 441 (1937); Mally v. Mally,
121 Iowa 169, 96 N. W. 735 (1903) ; Kansas: Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kan. 523,
38 Pac. 792 (1895) ; Maine: Curtis v. Curtis, 40 Me. 24 (1855) (family agree-
ment); Maryland: Keys v. Keys, 148 Md. 397, 129 Atl. 504 (1925); Massachu-
setts: Gadsby v. Gadsby, 275 Mass. 159, 175 N. E. 495 (1931) ; Missouri: Bank
of Moberly v. Meals, 222 Mo. App. 862, 5 S. W. 2d 1113 (1928) ; New Hampshire:
Peterborough Sav. Bank v. Hartshorn, 67 N. H. 156, 33 Atl. 729 (1891); New
Jersey: Bacon v. Bonham, 33 N. J. Eq. 614 (1881); New York: In re Strange,
164 Misc. 929, 300 N. Y. S. 23 (Surr. Ct. 1937); North Carolina: Boles v.
Caudle, 133 N. C. 528, 45 S. E. 835 (1903) ; Mastin v. Marlow, 65 N. C 695
(1871) ; McDonald v McDonald, 58 N C. 211 (1859) ; accord, Kornegay v. Miller,
137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 315 (1905) ; Ohio: Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio St. 253, 166
N. E. 193 (1929); Oklahoma: Kaylor v. Kaylor, 172 Okla. 535, 45 P. 2d 743
(1935) ; Pennsylvania: In re Norris, 329 Pa. 483, 198 Atl. 142 (1938) ; South
Carolina: Wallace v. Quick, 156 S. C. 248, 153 S. E. 168 (1930) ; Tennessee:
Tate v. Greenlee, 141 Tenn. 103, 207 S. W. 716 (1918) ; Texas: Young v. Hollings-
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person if made free from fraud and oppression and in good faith upon
a valuable consideration by one sui juris who survives the ancestor.a0
Another element necessary in some but not all of the majority rule
states is that the ancestor consent to the assignment of the expectancy.8 7
Equity treats the assignment as an executory contract to convey the
property to the assignee if and when it ceases to be an expectancy and
comes into the assignor's possession as a vested estate or interest, and
specific performance of the contract itself is decreed.38 In this situation
the purchaser receives only what the seller has; therefore, if the assigner
dies before his ancestor, no interest has ever vested in the seller nor will
any vest in his estate which will pass to his assignee. Thus, the as-
signor's heirs are not bound by the assignment because in such case
they take directly as heirs of the ancestor.8 9
North Carolina has for a long time followed the majority rule and
enforces the assignment of an expectancy to a third person.40 In Mc-
Donald v. McDonald,41 decided in 1859, Battle, J., said: "[The assignor]
had a right to make a contract to convey whatever interest he might in
future have in his cousin's property; and such a contract, when fairly
made upon a valuable consideration, the Court of Chancery will enforce
whenever the property shall come into his possession.1 42  As in other
worth, 16 S. W. 2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Vermont: Hoyt v. Hoyt, 61 Vt.
413, 18 AtI. 313 (1889) (family agreement); Virginia: Lewis v. Madisons, 15 Va.(1 Munf.) 303 (1810) (family agreement) ; Wisconsin: Hofineister v. Hunter, 230
Wis. 91, 283 N. W. 335, 121 A. L. R. 444 (1939); England: Bennett v. Cooper,
9 Beav. 252, 50 Eng. Rep. 340 (Rolls Ct. 1845).
"By assignment is meant a transfer of the expectancy to a third party,
stranger or co-heir, who is not the ancestor of the assignee.
"See cases cited note 34 supra.
Consent required: McClure v. Raben, 133 Ind. 507, 33 N. E. 275 (1893);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Wood, 78 Ind. App. 147, 134 N. E. 899 (1922);
Curtis v. Curtis, 40 Me. 24 (1855) ; Stevens v. Stevens, 181 Mich. 438, 148 N. W.
225 (1914). Contra: Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 231 N. W. 675 (1930) ;
Gadsby v. Gadsby, 275 Mass. 159, 179 N. E. 495 (1931) ; Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex.
427, 39 S. W. 287 (1897); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 61 Vt. 413, 18 Atl. 313 (1889);
Hofmeister v. Hunter, 230 Wis. 81, 283 N. W. 330 (1939); inference that no
consent needed: Stover v. Eycleshimer, 3 N. Y. 620 (1867); McDonald v. Mc-
Donald, 58 N. C. 211 (1859); Fritz's Estate, 160 Pa. 156, 28 Atl. 642 (1894);
Steele v. Frierson, 85 Tenn. 430, 35 S. W. 649 (1887).
38 In re Barnett, 124 F. 2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn.
41, 32 A. 2d 68 (1943) ; Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kan. 523, 38 Pac. 792 (1895) ;
Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, 109 N. E. 1015 (1915) ; In re Strange's Estate,
.164 Misc. 929, 300 N. Y. S. 23 (Surr. Ct. 1937); McDonald v. McDonald, 58
N. C. 211 (1859) ; Bayler v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. 37 (1861); Tate v. Greenlee,
141 Tenn. 103, 207 S. W. 716 (1918) ; Hale v. Hollon, mpra note 37; Hofmeister
v. Hunter, supra note 37.
" Donough v. Garland, supra note 38; Benson v. Benson, 180 N. C. 106, 104
S. E. 68 (1920); Johnson v. Breeding, 136 Tenn. 528, 190 S. W. 545 (1916);
French v. McMillon, 79 W. Va. 639, 91 S. E. 538 (1917).
"' Boles v. Caudle, 133 N. C. 528, 45 S. E. 835 (1903) ; Mastin v. Marlow, 65
N. C. 695 (1871); McDonald v. McDonald, 58 N. C. 211 (1859).
158 N. C. 211 (1859).
2 Id. at 214.
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jurisdictions, the assignment is treated as an executory contract en-
titling the assignee to a specific performance as soon as the assignor has
acquired the power to perform it.43
Where there is an assignment of a possibility coupled with an in-
terest, equity will also take cognizance of the transaction. 44 A possi-
bility coupled with an interest is a contingent one created in an instru-
ment, such as an executory devise, contingent remainder, springing use,
or shifting use.45 Such a future interest may be sold, transmitted, or
devised since it is a present contingent interest in an estate.48 The va-
lidity of the assignment of a possibility coupled with an interest "has
been sustained as an executory contract to convey, passing no present
interest or estate, but a mere right in equity, to be enforced by suit when
the contingency upon which the estate vests occurs. Such assignments
are sometimes sustained upon the doctrine of estoppel, especially when
the deed contains a warranty of title. It has also been held that an
assignment of such interest, while not passing any present legal title
or estate, does pass the equitable title of the assignor, which is perfected
by converting the assignor into a trustee for the benefit of the assignee
when the estate vests.' 47
Neither the release nor the assignment of an expectancy are favorites
of the courts and such transactions are examined with caution.4" They
may result in the taldng of undue advantage of an heir in distressed
and unfortunate circumstances. 49 Both are in disfavor because they
allow an expectant heir to spend his inheritance before it comes into
his possession. 5° The assignment has been the special object of criticism;
it has been called a gambling contract and therefore held unenforceable
in at least one jurisdiction.51 Also it has been said that an assignment
tends to destroy or lessen the ancestor's control over the expectant heir
by giving him independent means of gratifying his desires, thus en-
couraging extravagance and vice on his part.5 2  It may also create a
McDonald v. McDonald, 58 N. C. 211 (1859).
"Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 1015 (1915) ; SI mEs & SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 402 (2d ed. 1956) ; see also SIMES, FUTrRE INTEmSTS § 712(1st ed. 1936).
"Kornegay v. Miller, supra note 44, at 665, 50 S. E. at 318 (dictum).
"Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 315 (1905); Bodenhamer v.
Welch, 89 N. C. 79 (1883).
,7Id. at 664, 50 S. E. at 317.
8 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P. 2d 841 (1945) ; Kaiser v. Cobbey,
400 Ill. 214, 79 N. E. 2d 604 (1948); Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 231
N. W. 675 (1930) ; Kornegay v. Miller, supra note 46; Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio
St. 253, 166 N. E. 193 (1929) ; McConnell v. Corgey, 153 Tex. 49, 262 S. W. 2d
944 (1954) ; Graef v. Kanouse, 205 Wis. 597, 238 N. W. 377 (1931).
"'Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112 (1810) ; Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex. 427, 39
S. W. 287 (1897); SIXEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 395 (2d ed. 1956).
" Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 669, 50 S. E. 315, 319 (1905) (dicttm);
SIMEs & SMITm, FUTURE INTERESTS § 395 (2d ed. 1956).
" McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 25 N. E. 179 (1890).
52 Id. at 147, 25 N. E. at 182.
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desire in the purchaser for the early death of the ancestor. And, in
addition, it has been held that an assignment operates as a fraud upon
the ancestor, perhaps deluding him into leaving his property not to
the person intended but to a stranger."4 Thus it would appear that of
the two, the release is looked on less harshly because it generally keeps
the inheritance in the family and is more in the nature of a family
settlement, which is favored by the courts. 55
It would appear that Allen v. Allen and Coward v. Coward actually
left little room for doubt as to the validity of the relase of an expectancy
in North Carolina. However, the seemingly square holding contra in
Cannon v. Nowell caused confusion in this area. Price v. Davis has
at last removed this confusion.
THOMAS STEPHEN BENNETT
Fire Insurance-Estate by the Entirety-Insurable Interest-Right
to Proceeds
A husband and wife own an estate in land as tenants by the entirety.
The spouses are separated, the husband remaining the occupant of the
dwelling-house. He insures the home in his name alone for $4,000 and
pays the premiums from his own funds. The home burns and pending
payment of the claim by the insurance company the spouses obtain an
absolute divorce. To whom do the proceeds of the policy belong?
The above facts presented a case of first impression in North Caro-
lina.' The supreme court, reversing the decision of the trial court,
held in Carter v. Continental Ins. Co.2 that the husband's interest in
the property was not insurable for his benefit alone as a separate moiety
apart from the estate owned by him and his wife and the proceeds of a
policy so taken inured to the benefit of the entire estate. Thus, upon
absolute divorce the wife was entitled to one half of the proceeds,8
even though she was not named as insured or beneficiary in the policy
and had not contributed to the payment of premiums.
Ordinarily a fire insurance policy is a personal contract to indemnify
the insured for a loss sustained;4 and where one has an insurable in-
3 McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 147, 25 N. E. 179, 182 (1890).
" In re Edelman's Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962 (1905) ; Hale v. Hollon,
90 Tex. 427. 39 S. W. 287 (1897) ; See SImEs & SMITrH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 395
(2d ed. 1956).
" Bank of Wadesboro v. Hendley, 229 N. C. 432, 50 S. E. 2d 302 (1948);
Redwine v. Clodfeter, 226 N. C. 366, 38 S. E. 2d 203 (1946) ; Fish v. Hanson, 223
N. C. 143, 25 S. E. 2d 461 (1943).
1 Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N. C. 578, 89 S. E. 2d 122 (1955).
2242 N. C. 578, 89 S. E. 2d 122 (1955).
' Divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common.
'VANCE, INSURANCE § 13 (1951).
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